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This paper presents literature-based investor heuristic measurement variables to explain 
and predict excess returns in the U.S market. These variables are part of a behavioural model 
that aims to measure the anchoring, availability, confirmation, overconfidence, and 
representativeness heuristics. Empirical evidence, based on the NASDAQ100 index, suggests 
that the behavioural model is able to explain excess returns and that it can be incorporated in 
the Fama-French Three-Factor Model (hybrid model) to enhance the traditional models’ 
explanatory capabilities of regular stock returns. Lastly, this paper presents several in- and out-
of-sample forecasts that support the return predictability of the behavioural and hybrid models.   
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Modern portfolio theory was propelled by the stock market crash in 1929, the 
subsequent financial disclosure requirements, and the publications of Security Analysis 
(Graham and Dodd, 1934) and The Theory of Investment Value (Williams, 1938) (Kahn, 2018). 
Portfolio Selection (Markowitz, 1952) marked the beginning of efficient markets, rational 
investors, and available information era, later accompanied by other ground-breaking financial 
theories such as, The Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966; 
Black, 1972), Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970), Option Pricing Theory (Black and 
Scholes, 1973), and Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross, 1976). These asset-pricing models are part 
of the finance neoclassical approach, which dominated the academy until the 1970s. However, 
in the 1980s, it was noticed that efficient market models’ predictions were not able to explain 
the observed stock excess volatility, which, if true, could question the foundations of efficient 
market theory (Shiller, 2003). 
Financial theorists initiated empirical investigations on market efficiency and unveiled 
market anomalies (Banz, 1981; LeRoy and Porter, 1981; Shiller, 1981; Basu, 1983; Roll, 1983; 
De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; 1987; Stein, 1989; Bates, 1991) and market puzzles (Mehra and 
Prescott, 1985; Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991; Fama and French, 1992). Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision under Risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) consolidated some behavioural 
finance concepts, which will be further scrutinized in the Literature Review, with empirical 
evidence on systematic irrational behaviour. 
Efficient market hypothesis, or, neoclassical finance, believes that securities’ prices 
fully reflect their intrinsic value and investors are, therefore, perfectly rational agents. 
Behavioural finance, on the other hand, proposes that investors suffer from heuristics1 and 
 
1 Heuristics can be defined as cognitive shortcuts to help individuals process information by simplifying it, even if it includes 
disregarding it (Marewski and Gigerenzer, 2010). 
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cognitive bias2, which means that sometimes securities are mispriced due to investors’ irrational 
behaviour (Samson, 2020). Neoclassical theorists are reluctant in accepting behavioural finance 
mainly because of its disjoint collection of studies (Dimson and Mussavian, 1999) and, thus, 
lack of coherent theories, and because of the use of ex-post justifications for effects that had 
already been uncovered by traditional finance (Kahn, 2018). 
Consequently, this paper has three main aims: to gather enough literature on investors’ 
irrational behaviour to create a coherent theory based on a joint collection of studies; to use 
those studies to build a behavioural model, based on heuristic measurement, that is potentially 
capable of explaining current excess returns and predicting future ones, using ex-ante data; and, 
lastly, to assess if this behavioural model can be complemented with the traditional Fama-
French Three-Factor Model (FFTFM) in explaining and predicting regular stock returns.   
This paper is structured as follow: Section 2 provides a literature review for each of the 
main heuristics, presenting initial insights on past uncovered measurements, followed by 
Section 3, which deepens the heuristics’ methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the 
results of the robust linear regression and the in- and out-of-sample forecasts in line with 
previous studies. Section 5 introduces the main findings, identified limitations and future 
research recommendations.         
 
2. Literature Review 
Kahneman and Tversky are unarguably the founders of behavioural finance. The studies 
conducted through observations of human behaviour in the military and psychology 
experiments on undergraduates conceptualized most of the existing behavioural concepts. Even 
 
2 Cognitive biases are defined as systematic cognitive deviations from standard formal logic (Samson, 2020). 
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though the research was not directed at real investors, the implications of human behaviour are 
universal and can, therefore, be extrapolated to other fields (Kahn, 2018). 
The comprehension and construction of this papers’ model are dependent on the 
understanding of Kahneman and Tversky’s central contributions to behavioural finance, which 
can be divided into two fundamental theories. Initially, with the inception of the Prospect 
Theory, they empirically demonstrated that individuals tend to underweight events that are 
possible in comparison to those that are certain, thereby criticizing the expected utility theory. 
Hereafter expected utility would be a function of a valuation function, which derives from a 
reference point and not from final outcomes, and a weighting function, which derives from 
decisions weights rather than actual probabilities or degrees of belief. Contrary to prior beliefs, 
individuals applied alternative weights to gains and losses, favouring the probabilistic terms of 
the upside, alternatively known as loss-aversion. The Prospect Theory also implied that 
individuals’ decisions were determined by several psychological factors. Therefore, framing 
was conceptualized, even though it was previously discussed in the Prospect Theory. Framing 
implies that the perception of a problem and the probabilistic evaluation process can be altered 
depending on the connotations with which the options are presented. Consequently, quantitative 
studies based on questionnaires or other similar-type approaches will always have some degree 
of framing, whether intentionally or not, which makes it less viable to draw unbiased results. 
Therefore, heuristics quantitative data indicators, such as the ones further presented in 
Methodology, are, besides innovative, more reliable, and replicable.  
Nevertheless, such influential and innovative theories are always prone to criticism. 
According to McDermott’s article (2001), there are two main criticism worth mentioning. 
Tversky’s experiments do not replicate real-life problems, rather, these experiments are cleverly 
constructed, and thus, the subjects “cognitive biases” reflect the experiments’ difficulty and 
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selectivity (Gigerenzer and Murray, 1987; Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996). Tversky is accused of miss-
utilizing the subjects adaptiveness capabilities in decision making. By focusing on single events 
or unfamiliar tasks, the subjects were misled to worse results (Brade et al., 1998; Rose et al., 
1999). Despite the relevance of these objections, the theories still seem to hold, which means 
that only the study’s precision is being questioned, not the consequences. Thus, it is still 
pertinent to study the heuristics and cognitive bias that result from the Prospect Theory.  
Due to the dominant role that the psychological factors play in the decision-making 
process of investments selection, several biases that affect human behaviour have been 
unravelled. The conjunction of existing literature revealed the predominance of five 
behavioural biases, namely: anchoring bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; George and Hwang, 
2004; Shefrin, 2010; Samson, 2020), availability bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; 1974; 
Shefrin, 2010; Samson, 2020), confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998; Shefrin, 2010; Samson, 
2020), overconfidence bias (Belsky and Gilovich, 1999; Barber and Odean, 2000; Shefrin, 
2010; Samson, 2020) and representativeness bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; Shefrin, 
2010; Samson, 2020). 
Anchoring bias emerges from the attachment of a reference point in an individual’s 
judgement (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). Studies have proven that even when the subjects 
are alerted to their anchoring’s dissociation with the problem, its effects are still persistent. 
Anchoring causes investors to be more reluctant to buy (sell) assets (Colin and George, 2004; 
Li and Yu, 2012; Chang et al., 2017) or to incorporate good (bad) news (George and Hwang, 
2004) when current prices are close to historical highs (lows), thereby influencing investors 
trading patterns (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). The 52-week high ratio, further developed in 
Methodology, has been consistently used to proxy for the anchoring bias (George and Hwang, 
2004; Driessen et al., 2010; Hur and Singh, 2019). Empirical findings have shown that investors 
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tend to buy stocks when their prices are continuously and rapidly decreasing or continuously 
surpassing historical highs (Abdin et al., 2020). 
Availability bias is a form of probabilistic distortion caused by the facility with which 
the information is available. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) revealed that investors will 
evaluate the quality of a stock based on recent or easily recallable information, disregarding 
other relevant facts and past information. Barber and Odean (2008) revealed that investors will 
buy the most recent attention-grabbing stocks, thus, stock-picking correlates with the stock’s 
recent attention. Even though there is no direct relationship between the bias and these two 
measures, Kristoufek (2013), and Bollen at al. (2012), Ranco et al. (2015), and Nisar and Yeung 
(2018) have used Google Trends and Twitter, respectively, as potential capable tools for 
measuring attention-grabbing stocks, later scrutinized in Methodology. 
Confirmation bias occurs when individuals overweight information that confirms their 
prior beliefs and preconceptions, and underweight or completely disregard potential 
disconfirming information (Nickerson, 1998; Hart et al., 2009; Shefrin, 2010; Charness and 
Daves, 2017). Unfortunately, in line with Cafferata and Tramontana (2019), the literature on 
empirical demonstrations of confirmation bias is scarce. Nonetheless, Park et al. (2013) proved 
the existence of confirmation bias in investors through stock message boards3. Pouget et al. 
(2016), besides empirical evidence on this bias, presented novel predictions regarding analysts’ 
opinion dispersion and behaviour, also deepened in Methodology, and a unified rationale to 
explain excess volume, excess volatility, and momentum.  
Overconfidence results from a significant divergence between ones’ perceived 
capabilities and actual performance, which bestows an illusion of control and information 
 
3 Message boards are online discussion websites where users and readers can interact with one another in a specific topic of 
interest, which, in this case, are stocks. 
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precision causing incredulity to others’ beliefs (Belsky and Gilovich, 1999; Barber and Odean, 
2000). The pioneering Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (DHS) model (Daniel et. al, 
2002) empirically demonstrated that overreaction is continuous as investors overreact to their 
initial private information, and, due to self-attribution bias, their overconfidence is further 
enhanced on the subsequent arrival of information, which generates a momentum factor. 
Despite several attempts to explain market excess trading volume4, overconfidence seems to be 
the most predominant explanation for the active investing puzzle (Daniel and Hirshleifer, 
2015). Consequently, excess trading volume (Campbell et al., 1993; Hirshleifer, 2001; Agarwal 
et al., 2008; Hsu and Shiu, 2010; Boussaidi, 2013; Byun et al., 2016; Raharja et al., 2017; Yang 
et al., 2018) and momentum (Daniel et al., 2002; Hou et al., 2009; Asem and Tian, 2010) 
comprise the main indicators for investor overconfidence proxy.  
Representativeness arises when individuals over rely on stereotypes and thus misjudge 
an events’ probability of occurrence by comparing it with a similar event. This process can 
result from base rate neglect or sample size bias. In the former, individuals neglect the 
probabilities of an event and consequently have underconfident or overconfident assumptions 
relative to their initial events’ probability. In the latter, individuals, convinced that the sample 
is representative and significant, fundament their information and beliefs on inadequate data 
samples (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; Khan et al., 2017). Ganzach (2001) found that the 
analysts’ perceived risk and return of unfamiliar stocks depend on their global attitude: high 
(low) returns and low (high) risk will be attributable to stocks that are perceived as good (bad). 
Empirical studies (Shefrin, 2010; Kelly et al., 2011; Bordalo et al., 2019) indicate that analysts’ 
recommendations could be utilized as a proxy for investors’ representativeness.  
 
4 Excess trading volume, or active investing puzzle, corresponds to the phenomenon of aggressive trading. This strategy 




Besides these predominant heuristics, the joint body of literature consistently addressed 
some influential departing factors such as, idiosyncratic volatility (Ang et al., 2006; Peterson 
and Smedema, 2011), retail investors’ sentiment (Black, 1986) and retail investors’ presence in 
the financial markets (Odean, 1999). Idiosyncratic volatility measures the variations of returns 
that are not captured by asset-pricing models. With the Prospect Theory it is possible to explain 
the market anomaly, since investors value stocks differently from the traditional Bayesian rules. 
Similarly, Black (1986) discovered a noise factor that caused markets to be inefficient, but, 
simultaneously, it disabled the market from taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities due to 
market constraints. This noise was driven by the market expectations (retail investors’ 
sentiment) of noise traders (retail traders). Later, it was found that retail investors have a high 
degree of overconfidence, which leads to excess trading (retail investors’ presence in the 
financial markets) (Odean, 1999). Investors are reluctant to sell short and quickly sell after 
small profits (loss-aversion), this irrational behaviour, more predominant in retail investors, has 
an important influence in the market (Odean, 1999).   
Despite the topics’ controversy, prior literature suggests that retail investors are 
especially susceptible to heuristics when compared to institutional investors (Odean, 1999; 
Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Goetzmann and Massa, 2002; Schmeling, 2007; Barber and 
Odean, 2008; Franzinni and Lamont, 2008; Hur et al., 2010; Vrouenraets, 2011; Khan et al., 
2017), which makes it a crucial indicator, as high retail investor presence can potentially 
exacerbate the effect of heuristics. Some of the distinct approaches to measure retail investors’ 
presence (1) and sentiment (2) are, (1) New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quotes (TAQ) 
(Campbell et al., 2005; Barber et al., 2008; Kaniel et al., 2008), institutional ownership (Hwang 
et al., 2016) and 13(f) reports (Sias and Whidbee, 2010; Vrouenraets, 2011), and (2) Sentix 
(Schemling, 2007), American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) (Verma et al., 2008; 
Burghardt, 2010), and Investors Intelligence (Verma et al., 2008). 
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3. Data and Methodology  
 The data focuses on the U.S market, particularly on the constituents of the NASDAQ 
100 index, from March 2011 to July 2020 in a daily and weekly frequency. The NASDAQ 100 
index was the preferred index because it is the most volatile, due to its high-growth 
technological stocks, which could mean that it is highly influenced by behavioural factors. The 
companies were preventively selected as of 2011, through Bloomberg, to avoid survivorship 
bias. Only 66 companies were selected since the others had to be excluded due to inactivity or 
lack of data.  On the other hand, the time-horizon was chosen in accordance with the data’s 
availability and convergence. 
The data for closing and opening prices, trading volume, highs and lows, and market 
capitalization and book value of equity were retrieved from Refinitiv Reuters. Returns were 
calculated in logarithmic form instead of arithmetic. Log-returns are usually considered to be 
normally distributed, which is one of the main assumptions of the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression. Consequently, returns were calculated as 𝑙𝑜𝑔(
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑦
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑦−1
 ), where 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑦 is the 
closing price of day/week y and 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑦−1 is the closing of the previous day/week. The OLS 
regression creates a linear regression between one dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables. The estimated relationship is done by minimizing the sum of squares, 
which results from the difference between the observed and the predicted values of the linear 
regression.  
In this chapter, the variables will be organized according to the procedure that was 
followed in their construction and their corresponding heuristics will be identified after their 
introduction, Table 1 (Appendix). The first variables were constructed using only prices, 
volume and market capitalisation. Followed by analyst’s recommendation, Twitter, and 
Google, and lastly, the departing factors, such as AAII, retail investor proxy and FFTFM data.  
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Basing the rationale on Byun et al. (2016) cross-sectional study of the signed 
volume (𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡) method, two unorthodox variables using trading volume were developed: the 
retailed signalled volume, 𝑅𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡, and the signalled volume with a one-day lag, 𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡. Because 
the previous study was done in a cross-sectional regression, the replication of its variable would 
result in forward looking bias5. Therefore, to signal volume, the retail investor sentiment was 
used instead in 𝑅𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = {
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 > 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1  ⋀  𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 > 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡
−𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1  ⋁  𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡
, where 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the 
percentage of bullish retail traders in the AAII and 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the correspondent 8-week average 
(Overconfidence Bias). While on the 𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡, a one-day lag was applied. 𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 =
 {
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1,   𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 > 0
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 =  0
− 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 < 0
, where 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 are stock i’s trading volume and return 
with one day lag in respect to day/week t, respectively (Overconfidence Bias). It is expected 
from these variables to have a positive effect on returns as trade volume and returns are 
positively correlated (Byun et al., 2016). The closing prices and historical highs were used to 
construct the 52-week high ratio, 𝐺𝐻 =  
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
52−𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
  (George and Hwang (GH), 2004) 
(Anchoring Bias). It is expected to have a negative coefficient, since the anchoring causes 
reluctancy in investors to buy (sell) near historical highs (lows). As Campbell et al. (1993) 
suggested, a one-year backward moving average of turnover growth rate was subtracted to the 
log turnover series, 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑖,𝑡∗ 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
) − 𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1𝑦 (Overconfidence 
Bias). Its coefficient is presumably negative since, as previously explained, excess trading 
volume results in lower net returns. Incrementally, Ang et al. (2006) suggested that 
idiosyncratic volatility could be measured as, 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1, where 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑜𝐿 𝑖,𝑡−1 
corresponds to the volatility of a stock’s daily idiosyncratic returns over month𝑡−1. 
 
5 Forward looking bias occurs when the tests use data that would not have been available in the period being analysed. This 
usually leads the results to be closer to the desired outcomes of the test.  
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Idiosyncratic volatility should not persist after introducing other heuristic measurement 
variables since they should be able to price the variations of returns that are not captured by the 
traditional asset-pricing models, such as the FFTFM. 
Quarterly data on analysts’ number of estimates and their target prices’ standard 
deviation, mean, median, high and low was extracted from I/B/E/S to calculate analysts’ 
forecasts revisions (proxy for belief revision) and recommendations dispersion (a proxy for 
disagreement) (Pouget et al., 2014). These variables try to capture investors’ reluctant attitude 
in revising their initial signals or beliefs. If investors have an initial positive (negative) belief 
or signal, they will be less willing to revise their beliefs downward (upward) or to pay attention 
to subsequent negative (positive) signals. Revisions were constructed as the log-change of the 
mean target price, 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = log (
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
), and analysts’ dispersion is simply 
the standard deviation of their target prices’ (Confirmation Bias). To prevent the frequency 
mismatch between the model, which is in a daily or weekly basis, and the analysts’ data, which 
is in a quarterly basis, from originating missing data, a linear interpolation was constructed for 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡. Based on Shefrin (2010), Kelly et al. (2011) and Bordalo et al. (2019) suggestion 
of using analysts’ recommendations as a representativeness heuristic measurement, 𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡 was 
innovatively constructed as 𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠′𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
. It corresponds to the closing 
price of stock i over its’ mean analysts’ recommendation price in day/week t. The rationale is 
that when investors receive a buy (sell) recommendation, ceteris paribus, they will disregard all 
other relevant information, such as the price of the security (Kelly et al., 2011).  
Twitter data sentiment analysis has been widely accepted in the industry as an important 
indicator of market sentiment (Bollen at al., 2012; Ranco et al., 2015; Nisar and Yeung, 2018). 
Namely, it has been uncovered that Twitter can be used to assess the mood of the market and 
to correlate it with stock returns, yielding favourable results. Bollen et al. (2012) achieved an 
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86.7% accuracy in predicting the daily up and down movements in the closing prices of DJIA. 
Ranco et al. (2015) managed 1-2% abnormal returns by focusing on a Twitter sentiment 
strategy. Due to its importance, several platforms offer this type of data. Unfortunately, due to 
the inability to access most of them, data6 on bull and bear messages, their spread and ratio, and 
total messages were extracted from Quantopian (Availability Bias). Unfortunately, Quantopian 
only yielded data until the 1st of May of 2020, thus, in order to maintain the initial time horizons’ 
length, Twitter data was also extracted from Bloomberg from that point onward. Initially, 
Quantopian was preferred over Bloomberg because, within the same timeframe, Quantopian 
offered more information. In this case, 𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡
, corresponds to the 
fraction of stock i’s bullish messages scanned over the number of total messages scanned in 
day/week t; 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖,𝑡
, where BBR stands for Bull and Bear Ratio, 
corresponds to the fraction of stock i’s bullish scanned messages over the bearish ones in 
day/week t; finally, 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  log (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1
), corresponds to the stock i’s log-
change of the total number of messages in day/week t.   
Kristoufek (2013) proposed a novel approach to risk management by relying on Google 
queries to search for popular stocks, suggesting and proving that a stocks’ popularity is 
positively correlated with its risk. Therefore, Google Trends data7 was extracted. Google Trends 
provides scaled data ranging from 0, if no Google search queries were made that day/week, to 
1, if, within the researched timeframe, that day/week was the one with the highest number of 
search queries. Risteski and Davcev (2014) revealed an interpolation technique that would 
enable daily data extraction from Google Trends (Availability Bias) for more than 90 days, 
which was the data period limit at the time. The daily period limit is now 9 months, which is 
 
6 Provided by Professor Qiwei Han. Assistant Professor of Data Science at NOVA School of Business & Economics.  
7 Available at https://github.com/qztseng/google-trends-daily  
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still minimal for the purpose of this study. Although there have been uncovered two more 
techniques of data extraction: the daily data method and the overlapping method, the 
interpolation method8 was chosen due to its feasibility and easiness to use, besides being the 




represented the log-change of Google Trends data between day/week t and t-1. 
Besides Google Trends and Twitter, which can possibly analyse global market 
sentiment, as seen in prior literature, retail investors also represent a substantial portion of the 
market and, consequently, have an important role within it. Although retail traders provide 
liquidity to the market, they are also responsible for the mispricing of securities (Black, 1986). 
Hence, the AAII and Institutional Ownership, extracted from Compustat, in accordance with 
Verma et al. (2008) and Hwang et al. (2016), were used to obtain retail investors sentiment and 
presence, respectively. Institutional ownership data was removed from the analysis due to lack 
of data. Nonetheless, it was possible to extract both 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑡 = % Bullish Retail Tradest −
% Bearish Retail Tradest 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑡 =  8 − week Average of % Bullish Retail Tradest 
from AAII.  
Due to the inability to access TAQ database and because of the lack of data from 
institutional ownership, retail investor presence had to be measured in an unorthodox manner. 
As Vrouenraets (2011) proposed in his thesis, retail investor activity can be proxied by 
analysing the trading volume of the biggest online brokerage firms. In his thesis, Vrouenraets 
defined three conditions for the selection of the brokers: being a U.S based company, being 
publicly listed in the U.S and having a stable company history9. Since the objective is to 
measure the fraction of retail investors in the market, the third criterion is not of interest to this 
 
8 An adjustment factor: the division of a lower frequency data (weekly/monthly) by a higher frequency (daily/weekly), when 
they converge, is multiplied to the desired interpolated high frequency data (daily/weekly).   
9 This criterion resulted in the exclusion of TD Ameritrade. The company had made to many large mergers and acquisitions.   
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model, hence, the resulting brokers were Charles Schwab Corporation, E-Trade Financial 
Corporation, TD Ameritrade and Interactive Brokers Group Inc. After collecting the quarterly 
data for the number of trades from the 10-Q fillings of the aforementioned companies, the 




The main limitation of this indicator is the difference in frequency between the number of trades 
and the volume of the constituents, since, in this case, the numerator will be static for one 
quarter while the denominator changes weekly. 
FFTFM data was extracted from Kenneth R. French – Data Library, with the exception 
of market premium. Since it incorporates all companies from the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, 
when the object of study is only the companies of the NASDAQ 100 and it caused consistency 
issues. Additionally, instead of the value-weighted return of the NASDAQ 100, the return of 
the corresponding ETF, QQQ, was used to proxy market returns, so as to avoid autocorrelation 
with stock returns, which was then subtracted for the Fama-French risk-free rate, 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑡 = QQQ Returnst − Fama French risk − free ratet. The momentum 
factor also followed a similar approach to Fama-French, mainly because in Daniel et al. (2002), 
Hou et al. (2009) and Asem and Tia (2010) studies, momentum was used as a heuristic 
measurement variable. However, momentum is usually built on a single heuristic, meaning that 
the momentum factor is created based on a winner and loser portfolio, screened by this one 
heuristic. Contrarily, this model uses several heuristics, therefore that momentum construction 
is not replicable. Hence, 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑡 = 𝐷𝑊𝐴 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑡 −  𝑄𝑄𝑄 𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑡, where 
𝐷𝑊𝐴𝑡 is the momentum ETF for NASDAQ 100. Similar to 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑡, for the 
𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑡 factor, the DWA Momentum ETF was used instead of the Fama French 
Momentum factor because the former refers only to the NASDAQ 100 index. 
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The Y of the regression is the equally-weighted average of the excess returns derived 
from the FFTFM and the X’s correspond to the equally-weighted average of every company’s 
data for each bias. Since the purpose of this study is to understand if behavioural biases affect 
companies individually and if they serve as a forecasting tool for returns, the equally-weighted 
average was preferred over a weighted-average. Mainly because if different weights were 
attributed between companies, the most predominant ones would skew the regressions’ 
resulting coefficients. To test the significance of the regression after accounting for size and 
book-to-market, the model was further divided into the 25% and 75% percentiles of market 
capitalisation and book-to-market, BMi,t =
Book value of equityi,t
Market Capitalisationi,t
 (Fama and French, 1992),  
respectively. Furthermore, since the weekly data was always referent to Friday, an additional 
model was successfully built with data referent to Monday, with the intent to rule out any 
forward looking bias. See Table 1 (Appendix) for an overview on each bias.  
 
4. Results 
This study endeavoured to (1) investigate the explanatory power of heuristics relative 
to excess returns (behavioural model) and a possible conjunction between heuristics and the 
FFTFM (hybrid model), and to (2) investigate the predictability power of both the behavioural 
and hybrid models. For this purpose, this section will be divided into two main segments, the 
linear regression results, and the forecast results, for both the daily and weekly models. 
Regression Results – Behavioural Daily Model 
The models begin with the construction of the excess returns of FFTFM, Small Minus 
Big (SMB), High Minus Low (HML) and Market Premium, as previously defined. In the daily 
model it was redundant to create the excess returns derived from the FFTFM since the 
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regression suffered from autocorrelation. When the lags were applied to correct for the 
phenomenon, the model became unapt, Table 2 (Appendix). Additionally, the coefficients and 
t-statistics were corrected with the Huber/White/sandwich test since the models suffered from 
heavy heteroskedasticity, as depicted in Figure 1 (Appendix). 
The models will be composed of the 15 variables (1) that were previously presented in 
the Literature Review and Methodology. 
(1) 𝑌 = 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑡 + 𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑅𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐺𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑡 +
𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑡 + 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
After observing the null adjusted R-squared, excess returns were deemed inappropriate 
for the daily model and were then substituted with standard stock returns. Because excess 
returns are inappropriate and since 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 measures the volatility 
of idiosyncratic returns, the variable was excluded à priori from the 
model. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑡 was also removed due to the frequency gap 
between quarterly data from the brokers and the daily data of the 
volume. Due to the unfeasibility of calculating the signal with the 
weekly data of the AAII, 𝑅𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 was removed. 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡, 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡, 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑡 were also excluded after 
constructing the correlation matrix, Table 3 (Appendix). 
The daily regression yielded unfavourable results, with an 
R-Squared of 7.63%, Table 4. Indicating that these behavioural 
biases may not be relevant to explain returns on a daily frequency, 




































Mean VIF 1.09 
Table 4 – Daily Heuristic Robust 
Linear Regression. *, **, and *** 
represent significance at 90%, 95% 
and 99% confidence, respectively. 
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𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 remained significant. One important note that will become clearer later 
on, is that, in this time frequency, 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 has a significant, at 90% confidence, and negative 
coefficient (-0.085), which proves Kristoufek (2013) proposition that famous companies 
usually have lower returns and higher risk.  
 Normally, daily frequency data is overlooked because lower frequencies for returns are 
usually, approximately normally distributed. The value of the normality assumption is not in its 
ability to replicate reality, but rather in the support that it grants the model to provide useful 
insights (Eugene Fama, 1976). Since the daily model was incapable of explaining the variations 
of returns, the construction of the hybrid model and the forecasts for daily basis were 
disregarded.  
Regression Results – Behavioural Weekly Model 
In the weekly model, Table 5 (Appendix), the FFTFM does not suffer from 
multicollinearity, demonstrated by the Variance Inflation Factor of 1.68, or autocorrelation, 
depicted by the Durbin Watson test equal to 1.02, therefore the excess returns were created. 
Table 6 (Appendix) depicts the correlation matrix between the existing variables. 𝐺𝐻𝑖,𝑡 
seems to be the main source of the problem, therefore, one additional lag was added. Despite 
the existence of other high correlation levels between variables (>0,5), the model was regressed, 
Table 7. Even then, most of the coefficients were still non-significant. Nonetheless, before pre-
emptively removing these variables, the model was tested for market size and book-to-market 
ratio, specifically in the 25% and 75% percentiles of market capitalisation and book-to-market 
ratio, respectively. As Table 7 reveals, the predominant explanatory coefficients were of 𝑅𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡, 






































































































































































































Table 7 – Results from weekly excess return regressions of Full Sample, 25% and 75% percentile market capitalisation and book-to-
market.  
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡’s coefficient was not statistically significant, contrary to Kristoufek (2013), 
who found Google Trends to be a promising tool for risk diversification. Nonetheless, the 
results may be skewed due to the data interpolations that were forcibly constructed. Google 
Trends might still be a promising tool if used in a different time frequency or a shorter time-
horizon, as previously demonstrated, in which it is possible to extract data without manipulating 
it. Similarly, 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡, suffered linear interpolations to have complete data, which might 
have distorted the true significance of the variable. 
𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡’s coefficient was not significant, which was not surprising as the variable had 
weak support within the literature. On the contrary, both coefficients of 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑡 were surprisingly non-significant. Alternatively, 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑡’s coefficient 
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would have been significant if the Fama-French Momentum factor was used, however, it would 
have been unsuitable considering that the NASDAQ 100 is the index of study, rather than all 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms. 
Table 8 reveals the levels of correlation between the remaining variables and it points 
out some extremely high levels of correlation, which resulted in the exclusion 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑡, 
𝐺𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑡. 
 
RSV i,t SV i,t GH i,t-1 Dispersion i,t RP i,t Bull i,t BBR i,t ABR t BBS t Retail Proxy t 
RSV i,t 1.0000          
SV i,t 0.1155 1.0000         
GH i,t-1 -0.0280 0.0175 1.0000        
Dispersion i,t 0.0717 -0.0657 -0.2325 1.0000       
RP i,t 0.1644 0.1638 0.6685 0.2390 1.0000      
Bull i,t 0.0273 0.1322 -0.0085 -0.1660 -0.0213 1.0000     
BBR i,t 0.0679 0.0126 0.1279 0.2084 0.2687 0.5867 1.0000    
ABR t -0.0952 0.0545 0.4110 -0.1900 0.1785 0.0065 -0.2156 1.0000   
BBS t 0.4029 0.1083 0.4909 -0.1724 0.4288 0.0322 -0.0530 0.5739 1.0000  
Retail Proxy t 0.0166 -0.0393 -0.3074 0.7490 0.1451 -0.1814 0.0576 -0.2579 -0.2757 1.0000 
Table 8 – Correlation Matrix of the predominant weekly heuristic indicators 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑡, was a valuable variable as it had a negative coefficient in all of the 
models, Table 7, and it had high positive correlation (0.7490) with 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡. The negative 
sign could corroborate the idea that when retail investors entail a higher presence in the market, 
since they are more prone to fall under heuristics (Barber and Odean, 2008), returns decrease. 
The correlation with 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 could indicate a higher presence of retail investors in 
overvalued stocks, which happens when analysts’ forecast dispersion is high (Hwang et al., 
2016).  𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 also yielded interesting results, despite its non-significance. Namely because, 
as Peterson and Smedema (2011) suggested, the variable had a negative correlation with 
forecast revisions. The 𝐺𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 had high negative correlation (-0,7004) with 𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 because, 
as Driessen et al. (2010) discovered, both betas and volatility decrease when approaching a 
historical high or low and increase when that high or low is broken. Additionally, as suggested 
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by Hur and Singh (2019), high analysts coverage provides greater availability of information. 
Since stocks whose prices are further (closer) from their historical high experience more 
overpricing (under-pricing), due to informational reasons, there will be a positive correlation 
between analysts forecast revisions and the 𝐺𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1, as it was observed. Lastly, since the 
coefficient was negative and significant in all models at 99% confidence, Table 7, albeit the 
autocorrelation, the theory that investors become reluctant to incorporate good news and new 
information into their stock valuation when near 52-week high (George and Hwang, 2004) was 
confirmed. 
 After the removal of these variables, the model was 
regressed once again to test the significance of the remaining 
coefficients, Table 9. 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑡 had the only non-significant 
coefficient, most likely due to the removal of 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑡 since they were 
highly correlated, whereas the rest of the coefficients are jointly 
significant at 95% confidence.  
𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑡 and 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑡 coefficients’ statistical non-significance 
was not expected, but not surprising either, as the AAII is 
considered a contrarian indicator (Burghardt, 2010).  
On the other hand, 𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 had a positive (0.019) and significant, at 95% confidence, 
coefficient. The rationale is that when Twitter sentiment is increasingly bullish then market 
returns are prone to increase (Bollen et al., 2012; Nisar and Yeung, 2018). 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 had a 
positive (0.074) and significant, at 99% confidence, coefficient, which confirms Diether et al. 
(2002) and Johnson (2005) study, that demonstrates that investors tend to overvalue stocks with 
high levels of analysts’ forecast dispersion. 𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 coefficients were both very small 



























Mean VIF 1.11 
Table 9 – Robust Weekly Linear 
Regression of Heuristics 
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signalled by market returns or retail investors’ sentiment, returns will consequently raise (Byun 
et al., 2016). 𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡 had a positive (0.039) and significant, at 95% confidence, coefficient, which 
could imply that when prices move closer to the analysts’ recommendations mean, 
representativeness is enhanced and returns increase. 
Overall, despite the non-significance of some coefficients, the model provides vast 
conclusions regarding heuristics’ measurement. The replication of all the variables for each bias 
supported in the literature would be impractical. However, the conjunction of the literature for 
each bias provided a potential variable of convergence. An in-depth study of these convergence 
variables in each bias could provide better indicators for the model.  Nonetheless, despite the 
data that had to be manipulated or which had to be removed due to multicollinearity, the 
coefficients were mostly significant and in line with the literature.  
Regression Results – Hybrid Weekly Model 
The model seems to suggest that the behavioural model can explain the excess returns 
on a weekly basis. As previously stated, this paper also aims to incorporate the behavioural 
model in the FFTFM. In this case, the Y is the equally-weighted average of regular stocks 
returns. The correlation matrix between the two models led to the removal of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 
Table 10 (Appendix), due to its -0.6485 correlation with 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑡. According to 
Park (2005), analysts’ recommendation dispersion can be a measure of the difference between 
investors’ expectations rather than a measure of risk-aversion. This could imply that when 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is high, there is less confirmatory bias in the market, expectations become less 
favourable and the 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑡 will be lower. The model was successfully combined 
as only 𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡’s coefficient lost its significance, Table 11. Nisar and Yeung (2018) found a 
weak correlation between Mood, a Twitter sentiment variable, and FTSE 100 returns. The 
merger between the FFTFM and the behavioural biases can boost the R-Squared obtained by 
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the FFTFM alone from 35.30% to 50.10%, without autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity or 
multicollinearity issues.  
Forecast Results 
As proposed, 𝑅𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡, 𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 
and 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑡 will also be tested for their predictability power. The 
forecast will be split between an in-sample forecast, using the 
fitted values of the robust linear regression, and an ex-ante out-of-
sample forecast, using an ARCH/GARCH model. Additionally, 
the results will always be divided between the behavioural biases 
model, which will only use the heuristics, and the hybrid model, 
which will merge the FFTFM with the heuristics. 
In-Sample Forecast Results  
The in-sample forecasts, Table 12, presents 
considerably high accuracy in predicting both the 
upside (bull) and downside (bear) returns of the 
market, ≥ 70% in both models. Simultaneously, the 
Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE) is 
approximately 0,00% for both models and the Mean 
Absolute Errors (MAE) is stable at around 0,50%. 
The predicted returns of both models in the 25%, 
50% and 75% percentiles correspond to less than half of a standard deviation of the observed 
returns. The predicted return percentiles 0% and 100%, on the other hand, correspond to two-

































Mean VIF 1.07 
Table 11 – Weekly Hybrid Robust 
Linear Regression 
Table 12 – In-Sample forecast results for the behavioural 







Accuracy Bull 75,31% 77,16% 
Accuracy Bear 74,19% 69,15% 
MAE 0,52% 0,58% 




Percentile 0% -1,90% -3,77% 
Percentile 25% -0,28% -0,33% 
Percentile 50% 0,01% 0,20% 
Percentile 75% 0,38% 0,63% 
Percentile 100% 1,39% 2,24% 
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in Graphs 1 and 2 (Appendix), where there are huge dispersion peaks between the predicted 
and the observed returns. 
Before moving forward to the out-of-sample forecasts, an in-sample with one additional 
lag on all variables was constructed to extend the robustness of the initial in-sample forecast. 
In this case, due to the added lags, only two coefficients were significant for both the 
behavioural and hybrid models, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1, and 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1, 
respectively. Possibly because the lag does not change their data since it does not update on a 
weekly basis. The behavioural model, as in previous forecasts, tends to understate returns, while 
the hybrid model, possibly due to the addition of the FFTFM, tends to overstate returns. 
Consequently, the behavioural model has a higher accuracy in the downside of returns and the 
hybrid model in the upside of returns. Additionally, the dispersion measures are smaller than 
the previous forecasts, Table 13 (Appendix). Graphics 3 and 4 provide evidence that the 
forecasts may be more appropriate with one lag, as the overstating and understating of returns 
soothes down, possibly because the models are using less forecasting variables.  
Out-of-Sample Forecasts Results  
The ARCH/GARCH forecasting method is a benchmark for out-of-sample forecasts, thus it 
was the preferred forecasting tool. After ruling out seasonality, confirming that returns were 












In-Sample Hybrid Forecast Observed
Graph 3 - Cumulative Returns of the in-sample lagged forecast and 
observed returns for the behavioural model 
Graph 4 - Cumulative Returns of the in-sample lagged forecast and 
observed returns for the hybrid model 
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averages and GARCH effects, the ex-ante forecast 
was constructed. The in-sample data consisted of 
2 3⁄  of the full sample and the remaining 1 3⁄  would 
correspond to the out-of-sample forecast, 
additionally, all the independent variables were 
lagged by one week. In essence, the forecast is only 
using available data at the time of the event, thus 
could be considered ex-ante forecasting. Both 
forecasts had good dispersion measures, Graph 5 and 6. However, there was a reversal in the 
behavioural model, since now it was not able to predict the downside returns, Table 14, possibly 
due to the absence of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 in this forecast. The significant coefficients for the 
behavioural and hybrid model were, 𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑅𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory unravelled a new perspective to investors’ 
decision making. Since then, several authors have tried to prove that investors do not follow the 







Accuracy Bull 85,71% 82,47% 
Accuracy Bear 18,75% 47,06% 
MAE 0,24% 0,27% 




Percentile 0% -0,36% -2,08% 
Percentile 25% 0,18% -0,06% 
Percentile 50% 0,49% 0,15% 
Percentile 75% 0,79% 0,44% 
Percentile 100% 3,05% 0,95% 
Table 14 - Out-of-Sample forecast results with one-week 
lag for the behavioural model (left) and the hybrid 
model(right) 
Graph 5 - Cumulative Returns of the out-of-sample lagged forecast 
and observed returns for the behavioural model 
Graph 6 - Cumulative Returns of the out-of-sample lagged 













Out-of-Sample Hybrid Forecast Observed
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cognitive biases and heuristics. Based on a sample of the 2011 NASDAQ 100 stocks, this paper 
uses literature-wide indicators to proxy the arguably main heuristics in the financial markets, 
anchoring bias, availability bias, confirmation bias, overconfidence bias and representativeness 
bias. The first hypothesis is that heuristics are able to explain and predict excess returns and the 
second one is that heuristics can be combined with FFTFM to explain and predict stocks returns. 
The daily model was incapable of explaining excess returns, presumably because of the 
statistical inability to provide useful insights when the normality principle is densely disrupted. 
However, although various coefficients were not statistically significant, the weekly model was 
able to capture vast variations of excess returns, and the variables intercorrelation provided 
evidence that validated their hypothesis in accordance with the literature. Heuristics were also 
successfully combined with FFTFM and were able to augment the traditional factors 
explanatory capabilities. Simultaneously, the in- and out-of-sample forecasts provide insights 
on the goodness-of-fit of the model’s return predictions. The lagged in-sample forecast yielded 
better results than the in-sample forecast without the lags. The behavioural out-of-sample 
forecast has small accuracy in predicting the down movements of the market. Nonetheless, the 
hybrid model had small dispersion measures and high accuracy in both up and down 
movements, which indicates that it is highly capable of capturing the returns variations. 
Consequently, it might be a good forecasting model for future research.  
In future research it would be interesting to assess if other models with slower time 
frequencies, such as monthly or quarterly data, arrive at similar indicators and significance 
levels for their corresponding coefficients in explaining excess returns. Additionally, it would 
be interesting to verify if the coefficients of Google and Revisions gain significance with this 
time frequency change, as previously discussed. Lastly, it would be interesting to study if other 
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BIASES REPRESENTS FORMULAS 
Anchoring Bias: 
  
𝑮𝑯𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 52-Week High Ratio 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
52 − 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
 
Availability Bias:   











Bull and Bear Sentiment Tweet 
Ratio 
𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖,𝑡
 
𝑴𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊,𝒕 


















Overconfidence Bias:   
𝑴𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒖𝒎𝒕 Momentum Factor 𝐷𝑊𝐴 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑡 −  𝑄𝑄𝑄 𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑡 
𝑺𝑽𝒊,𝒕 1-day Lagged Signalled Volume {
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1,   𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 > 0
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 =  0
− 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 < 0
 
𝑹𝑺𝑽𝒊,𝒕 
Retail Investor Signalled 
Volume 
{
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡  𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 > 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋀ 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 > 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡
−𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡  𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 ⋁ 𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑖,𝑡
 
𝑻𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒊,𝒕 Stocks Turnover 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡


















8-Week Average of Bullish 
Retailers from AAII 
8 − week Average of % Bullish Retail Tradest 
𝑩𝑩𝑺𝒊,𝒕 
Bullish – Bearish Retailers 
Sentiment from AAII 
% Bullish Retail Tradest 





Retail Investors’ Presence 
Proxy 
𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠′ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡




















Table 1 – Overview of each Biases variables 





















𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒖𝒎𝒕−𝟏  
-0.096 
(0.04) 
R-Squared 69.81% 1.58% 
Durbin-Watson Test 0.93 2.03 
Mean VIF 1.02 1.02 













RP Bull BBR ABR BBS 
Moment
um 
1.0000           
SV 0.0285 1.0000          
GH -0.0379 0.0397 1.0000         
Turnover 0.0102 -0.0197 -0.1827 1.0000        
Dispersi
on 
0.0011 -0.0127 0.2068 -0.1778 1.0000       
Revision
s 
-0.0280 0.0522 0.2354 -0.1860 -0.0558 1.0000      
RP -0.0268 0.1148 0.3623 -0.5283 0.2518 0.5687 1.0000     
Bull 0.0428 0.0212 -0.1375 0.1391 -0.0761 -0.0286 -0.1016 1.0000    
BBR 0.0311 0.0537 -0.0100 -0.1196 0.1800 0.0523 0.2626 0.3912 1.0000   
ABR -0.0102 0.0101 0.1541 0.0521 -0.1884 0.2205 0.1533 0.0174 -0.2055 1.0000  
BBS -0.0095 0.0316 0.2668 -0.1955 -0.1657 0.3115 0.4054 -0.0022 -0.0597 0.5633 1.0000 
Mess 0.0557 0.0209 -0.0005 0.0897 -0.0006 -0.0054 0.0085 0.0758 0.1698 -0.0018 0.0001 
Google -0.0324 -0.0282 -0.0349 -0.0519 0.0205 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0171 0.0245 -0.0178 0.0030 
 
Mess Google 
Mess 1.0000  
Google 0.0255 1.0000 
 





















































RP Bull BBR 
Moment
um 
1,0000           
RSV -0,0413 1,0000          
SV -0,0142 0,1155 1,0000         
GH -0,0088 -0,0280 0,0175 1,0000        
Turnover -0,0416 -0,1554 -0,0544 0,0429 1,0000       
IVOL -0,0801 -0,0245 -0,0163 -0,7004 -0,0447 1,0000      
Dispersi
on 
-0,0304 0,0717 -0,0657 -0,2325 -0,0004 0,1887 1,0000     
Revision
s 
-0,0302 -0,0621 0,0439 0,6870 0,1272 -0,5070 -0,1203 1,0000    
RP -0,0358 0,1644 0,1638 0,6685 -0,0831 -0,5775 0,2390 0,5775 1,0000   
Bull -0,0234 0,0273 0,1322 -0,0085 0,0256 -0,0789 -0,1660 -0,0106 -0,0213 1,0000  
BBR -0,0310 0,0679 0,0126 0,1279 0,0566 -0,1915 0,2084 0,0382 0,2687 0,5867 1,0000 
ABR 0,0035 -0,0952 0,0545 0,4110 0,0333 -0,1052 -0,1900 0,3007 0,1785 0,0065 -0,2156 
BBS -0,0351 0,4029 0,1083 0,4909 -0,1148 -0,3133 -0,1724 0,3178 0,4288 0,0322 -0,0530 
Mess -0,0713 -0,0213 0,0575 0,0003 0,3378 0,0201 -0,0094 0,0664 0,0412 0,0998 0,1177 
Google -0,0259 0,0567 -0,0195 0,0162 0,0428 -0,0431 0,0229 -0,0153 0,0153 0,0460 0,0404 
Retail 
Proxy 
-0,0139 0,0166 -0,0393 -0,3074 -0,0569 0,3000 0,7490 -0,0532 0,1451 -0,1814 0,0576 
Table 5 – Results from weekly excess return regression with FFTFM 
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 ABR BBS Mess Google 
Retail 
Proxy 
ABR 1,0000     
BBS 0,5739 1,0000    
Mess -0,0265 0,0015 1,0000   
Google 0,0123 0,0294 0,0437 1,0000  
Retail 
Proxy 
-0,2579 -0,2757 -0,0158 -0,0342 1,0000 
Table 6 – Correlation Matrix for all initial weekly heuristic indicators 
 
 SMB HML 
Market 
Premium 
RSV SV RP Bull Dispersion ABR 
SMB 1.0000         
HML 0.0515 1.0000        
Market 
Premium 
0.1674 0.0318 1.0000       
RSV 0.1558 0.0520 0.0642 1.0000      
SV 0.0836 -0.1104 0.2141 0.1112 1.0000     
RP 0.1443 0.0594 0.0785 0.1640 0.1636 1.0000    
Bull 0.0157 -0.0386 0.0388 0.0266 0.1325 -0.0213 1.0000   
Dispersio
n 
-0.0206 -0.0984 -0.6485 0.0745 -0.0687 0.2386 -0.1663 1.0000  
ABR -0.0372 -0.0560 0.0635 -0.0998 0.0596 0.1780 0.0073 -0.1932 1.0000 











In-Sample Behavioural Forecast Observed













Accuracy Bull 58,85% 64,93% 
Accuracy Bear 82,59% 36,32% 
MAE 0,57% 0,79% 




Percentile 0% -0,48% -0,53% 
Percentile 25% -0,25% -0,06% 
Percentile 50% -0,11% 0,09% 
Percentile 75% 0,26% 0,22% 
Percentile 100% 1,37% 1,27% 









In-Sample Hybrid Forecast Observed
Graph 2 - Cumulative Returns of the in-sample forecast and observed returns for the hybrid 
model 
 
